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A Procedure for Testing the Signalling Hypothesis* l. Introduction The signalling-model of the return s to education as developed by Spene e (1974), Arrow (1973) and Stiglitz (1975) represents an important theoretical contribution to the economics of information, but whether this contribution is of significant empirical consequence is an open question. This paper develops and applies a general method for addressing this question.
The signalling interpretation of the returns to education depends upon employers' lack of information about job applicants. Workers (applicants) are assumed to have a good idea about their productivities, but, a priori,
• employers are not. If the less productive cannot be induced to admit to that fact, then the employer considering job applicants will be forced to "estimate" applicants' productivities.
It is suggested that educational background may serve as an ideal observable trait for the employer to use to infer other, unobservable traits related to productivity. That education can be so used depends *This paper has gone through several versions and two data sets. The ·.earliest version was presented at the 1974 Econometric Society meetings in San Francisco. The guidance and encouragement of Roy Radner on the early versions is gratefully acknowledged. The latest version was presented at a conference on Labor Market Issues in Sweden held at the Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research, Stockholm in July 1979. The comments of severa1 of the conference participants, especially Bertil Holmlund, have been incorporated into the text. upon the assumption that the cost of education varies inversely with productivity. Under this assumption only the inherently more productive will find extra education worthwhile. Employers' initial beliefs that the educated are more productive will be self-fulfilling.
This basic objection to the signalling hypothesis is that the educational screen is a costly one. OUght not there exist less expensive alternative mechanisms to elicit information about productivities from applicants?
It is sometimes asserted, for example, that any signalling component to the rewards to education would be eroded by the establishment of "testing firms." Alternatively, firms may be able to structure their promotion pOlicies in such a way as to deter applicants from misstating their qualificationsi that is, applicants may be induced to self-select into the proper job slots. These arguments, however, lack any empirical basis.
My approach to the signalling hypothesis will be to examine directly the question of whether employers reward education for purely informational purposes in the hi ring decision. The role of education in the hiring decision will be decomposed into a pure "productivity component" and a pure "information component." This is most naturally done within a 2-way analysis of covariance framework withinteractions between education and "information."
In the next section I develop the statistical procedure for tes ting the signalling hypothesis. Then, in the third section, I present an application 3 of this method to a recruitment by the Swedish auto manufacturer Volvo.
The results of this application provide both an illustration of the procedure and some substantive evidence about the signalling hypothesis.
Finally, in a concluding section, I summarize the method and relate my procedure to another approach presented in Riley (1979}. 4 
A General Procedure
Suppose an employer is considering applicants for a position who can be characterized by their educational background and by their "information level, " Le., the amount of a priori information the employer has about them. According to the signalling hypothesis, employers need to use education as a source of information about applicant productivities, i.e., applicants cannot be induced to proper ly self-select by some cheaper means. Therefore, if the signalling hypothesis is valid, employers will be forced to rely more heavily on education when considering those applicants about whom they have the least information. The test procedure presented below is an exploitation of this simple idea, Typically "information level" will be a qualitative variable, and of ten educational attainment will be as well. If part of this positive overall weight can be ascribed to an informational component, then the positive effect of education ought to be decreased in the presence of alternative information; i.e., we expect the interaction effect for high education together with high information to be negative.
Analogous arguments can be made to sign the other interaction terms, but these are redundant since there is only one independent interaction parameter in this 2x2 case. Alternatively, if the employer is not forced lThe concepts of main effects and interaction effects in 2-way analysis of variance models are lucidly discussed in Scheffe (19591. 7 to use education as a source of information, then the effect of education should be constant across all information levels. Thus, a test of the hypothesis that the employer does not use education for informational purposes may be expressed as
It is to be emphasized that the hypothesis of zero interaction effects is not the hypothesis that the employer is indifferent about the educational attainment of applicants, nor is it the hypothesis that the employer is indifferent about the amountof a priori information available about prospective employees. These hypotheses instead translate into hypotheses about the main effects.
Nor does the hypothesis of zero interaction effects imply that an employer's preference for applicants about whom more information is available need sol ely reflect a preference for more information. There may be differences in average productivity across information classes, but these differences ought to be reflected in the main effects of information, rather than in differential rewards to education. However, one must be on guard for other mechanisms that might introduce an interaction between education and information, and such alternative mechanisms are easier to imagine when information is not "neutral." The point, of course, is that one must be careful in specifying "information classes." The information class of the applicant is identified with the source of his or her recruitment. The first recruitmenr source -and this is the source to be identified with greater prior information -is recommendation by a current Volvo employee; that is, the applicant has given the name of a Volvo employee who has informed him of the job opening and from whom the personnel department can solicit an evaluation. Of course, such an evaluation may not be unbiased, but it seems reasonab1e that the company 2These data were kind ly made available to me by Göte Bernhardsson and Anne-Marie Qvarfort of the Employment Research Group in the Swedish Labor Market Department. Their report on Volvols recruitment practices is available in mimeo as "Personalrekryteringen till Volvo-Torslandaverken, Juni 1978 11 ~ Sysselsättningsutredningen, Qctober 1978. 9 can take the caliber of the reference into account. The other two recruitment sources are identified with less prior information. The first of these relatively low information sources is the Swedish Labor Market Board {AF}. This refers to job seekers who have searched AF's position announcements and have then come to Volvo with a notification from that Board. No active placement on AF's part is implied. Second, there are those who have simply applied in response to newspaper advertisements (plus a small group from "miscellaneous ll sources). In principle., those who come· via AF and those who come via advertisement are in an equally low information category. However, there is the possibility of more active placement on the part of the AF for some candidates. This potentially has both the implication of more information and the implication of a decrease in the probability of hire for those candidates since AF is more likely to make an active effort on behalf of those who are "difficult to employ." These two low information categories have been combined in the empirical results (~) more highly educated applicants, (2) applicants in the high information ca tegory , (3) younger applicants, (4)-Swedish and Finnish national s , (5 L non-Gothenburg residents and (6) males. The only surprise in the data is the preference given to those living out of the greater Gothenburg region where the plant is located. However, the relatively low number of non-Gothenburg residents (and the even lower number of femalesl among the applicants should be noted.
The model that has been estimated inverts equation (2) to express ~-l(pl. Table 2 .
The parameter estimates may be interpreted with the aid of a simple
example. An applicant who {ll has a low level of education, (21 falls in the high information category, (.3) is between the ages of 21-27, The pattern of main effects in Table 2 is in basic accord with that suggested by the raw data in Table l . Completion of the gymnasium, Swedish or Finnish nationality and being male strongly increase the chance of getting hired, and these main effects are significant at the 1% level. Having a Volvo employee to use as a reference also increases the hire probability, but not as stronglYi and the factors of age and residence, while retaining the same pattern as in the raw data, become much less important. In fact, the anomalous apparent preference for non-Gothenburg residents essentially becomes zero when the covariation betweenresidence and other variables is taken into account. The significance probabilities for the main effects of information, age and residence (0.15, 0.35 and 0.65, respectively) are above conventionally accepted leveIs.
The interaction effects take on the sign pattern suggested by the signalling hypothesis, i.e., the positive effects of extra education are decreased
in the presence of extra information, but these effects are quite small in rnagnitude. The significance probability for the education-information is only slightly less than 0.5. The hypothesis of zero interaction effects clearly cannot be rejectedi that is, the hypothesis that there is no pure ly informationaI component to the preference exhibited for the more educated applicants cannot be rejected. Volvo's hiring behavior
gives no support to the signalling hypothesis in this instance.
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Finall~, it should be noted that the results are insensitive to ~~-~ara meterization of the basic model. Alternative medels have been estimated with (l) age as a continuous variable, (2) 3 information categories instead of 2, (3) interactions between education and national ity and information and national ity and (41 residence and sex supressed as separate variables. In addition the model with residence and sex supressed has been re-estimated by the alternative technique of "minimum normit chi-square," i.e., weighted least squares based on the cell relative frequencies, as developed by Berkson (1955) . The basic conclusions remain the same.
Discussion
This paper has presented a procedure for testing the signalling hypothesis based on a decomposition of the role of education in the hiring decision in to a pure "productivity " component and a pure "information" component.
The procedure was applied to a recruitment of auto workers by Volvo, and in this instance Volvo's hiring behavior indicates no support for the signalling hypothesis. Volvo prefers applicants with more education and (weakly) prefers applicants about whom more information is available, but in the absence of that extra information no significantly different premium is attached to extra education. That is, Volvo does not appear to rely on education for purely informational purposes in the hiring process.
Of course, this same procedure could be applied to different sets of data, and one aim of this paper is to motivate the collection of 13 richer data set s for replication. AS explained above, and as illustrated in the Volvo application, the trick is to define the concept of "information level" in a suitable way.
The procedure developed in this paper is very "micro" in the sense that it focusses on the significance of signalling at the level of the individual job and at the level of the individual employer. More "macro" approaches are also possible, and such approaches 'can be considered complementary to the method advocated here. In my opinion, the best of these macro approaches is presented in Riley (1979 (1977) ., Riley gives a good discussion and critique of these papers. 14 way to ensure the differences in earning profiles between the screened and unscreened sectors for a given education level can be solely ascriBed to the screening function of education. But these practical problems are analogous ~o the ones which make the application of this paper's procedure difficult; name ly , suitably defining what one means by "information" and ensuring that specious interactions between education and information are controlled.
To summarize, empirical analys is of the significance of signalling appears to have reached the point where well-founded techniques are becoming available. However, the data requirements imposed by these techniques have proven to be rather stringent. One advantage of the procedure and application presented in this paper is that these data requirements have been clarified, and one can hope that further applications will be possible.
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